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Abstract
The study investigates how market uncertainty and government ownership are associated with tax
avoidance and auditor's opinion. The Iranian market is highly volatile and dominated by government
ownership, which holds implications on the shareholders' interests. Our research uses a comprehensive
data set of 115 listed companies in Tehran Stock Exchange during 2012-2018, using logistic regression
technique. We find out that market uncertainty intensifies the positive relationship between tax
avoidance and the auditor's modified opinion. The findings indicate that the government presence in the
ownership increases the tax avoidance, and hence changes the auditor's report.4
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1. Introduction
Integrated auditing is an evaluation process of a company's financial statements which ends
with an opinion on the company's financial statements (PCAOB, 2010). The independent
auditor's opinion is an external mechanism of corporate governance. It evaluates and confirms
the honesty of prepared financial statements (Cohen et al., 2011), the effectiveness of internal
control reduces the information asymmetry, and bridles the manager's incentive to avoid the
tax. As a result, the auditor either approves the reports or submits a modified opinion.
Each manager has the opportunity to hold the private information from the shareholders to
achieve personal interest (Ayers et al., 2009). The asymmetric information mentioned in the
principle-agent theory signals the importance of the independent auditor's opinion for any
company, as it leads to considerable warnings of uncertainty like probable bankruptcy. The
lack of a well-timed reaction may lead to wrong decision-making, which may harm the
shareholders' interests (Cullinan, et al., 2013; Ayers et al., 2009). Such an opinion would
eliminate the moral hazards which come from the conflict of interest between the management
(agent) and the shareholders (principal) (Griffin et al., 2013).
The unstable economic and political conditions create market uncertainty with less
transparency and asymmetric information. The information gap between inside and outside
users calls the investors (outside users) to rely heavily on the independent auditor's report
(Choi, 2015) to get valid information for their decision-making.
Tax avoidance is a hidden activity considered tax-saving procedure (Chen et al., 2014) which
transfers the wealth resources from the government to the shareholders (Desai & Darmapala,
2009). It raises the firm's auditing risk represented by the modified opinion (Simunic, 1980).
Such risk may damage the firm's validity and reputation and lead to a significant loss, mainly
if the company is publicly traded. Bond and Devereux (2003) stated that the tax avoidance is
more frequent during uncertainty conditions, where the firms are under the pressure of reduced
cash inflows (Badertscher et al., 2019).
Recent studies reported that uncertainty leads to more tax avoidance/evasion (Dyreng et al.,
2019; Edward et al., 2015). Investors who are faced with uncertain government policies may
use tax avoidance as risk premia to compensate for the higher financing cost in the equity
markets (Pástor & Veronesi, 2013; Law & Mills, 2015).
Sudibyo and Jianfu (2016) claim that government ownership creates a conflict of interests
which affects tax reporting. The government wants to maximize tax revenues to fulfill social
and political goals. However, the company's manager, who is hired by the government has the
opportunity via his network/relations to avoid the taxes (corruption) for profitability goal which
creates an unexpected implicit conflict of interest between the government and the manager
(Mafrolla, 2019).
Iran is ranked 79 among 80 countries in Performance Ranking and Economic Conditions by
the Global Bank in 2019. It indicates unstable economic conditions and limited access to
information in the country. Private local firms have limited strategies to increase the future
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value of their investments due to the lack of reliable information. The stock market in Iran is
highly volatile which depends on macroeconomic variables with a shortage of foreign
investors.
A significant number of private investors recently exited the market due to the market
uncertainty and volatility caused by government decisions (Campello et al., 2010).
Consequently, government investments have crowded out private investment. Iranian
parliament reported 1155 out of 244 listed companies are either owned by the government or
controlled by organizations with 50% of government shares. 66% of stock market capitalization
belongs to firms where the government is their major shareholder. No previous study has
looked at the impact of uncertainty and government ownership on the independent auditor's
opinion in Iran. The current study fills this literature gap by answering two questions; Does
market uncertainty increase the tax avoidance effect on the auditor's modified opinion? Does
government ownership increase the tax avoidance effect on the auditor's modified opinion?
2. Literature review and hypotheses development
Tax avoidance is elusion from paying tax within the structure of tax regulations without
violating the rules (Agrawal, 2007). Tax avoidance processes refer to the tax-saving tools
which transfer the resources from the government to the shareholders (Desai & Darmapala,
2009). By providing a free cash flow, the corporates use the tax avoidance strategy to reduce
tax, directly affecting their performance and value (Lehn & Poulsen, 1989). However, such
strategies have some inevitable consequences too. It is stated by Hanlon and Heitzman (2010)
that tax avoidance processes bring about the direct and indirect tax expenses for the corporates
including the economically material fines, interest, and penalties that the internal revenue
service can impose for under-reporting. Considering the ownership is separated from
management within the structure of agency theory, tax avoidance fades the corporate`s clarity
which provides an opportunity for the managers to take personal benefits of free cash flow
(Chen et al, 2014); also, it raises the conflict between the owners and the managers (Bushman
& Smith,2001).
Balakrishnan et al. (2019) reported that the firm's aggressive tax behavior reduces information
transparency and causes asymmetric information, leading to errors in investors' forecasting and
decision-making. Auditing is a tool to certify the quality of financial statements (Chen et al.,
2010), and the independent audit report helps the financial statement users make the
appropriate decisions. It means that via an unmodified audit report, the audit claims that all
accounting standards were followed. Hence, the validity of financial statements is raised in this
way (Abad et al., 2017). The theoretical foundations show that there is an endogenous
relationship between tax avoidance and audit report.
Opinions issued by the external auditor will have an impact on stakeholders, including
company management so that the higher the quality of audit process, the management will
think a lot about carrying out transactions or activities which will harm the company including
tax avoidance which has a chance of incurring tax fines in the future (Tarmidi et al., 2020). On
5
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the other hand, tax avoidance makes the information different from the reality which was
published by the manager via the financial statements; hence, it increases the risk of financial
information manipulation. Under such circumstances, the audit would have more likely to
detect the distortions and to identify the wrong information. In the absence of empirical
evidence, the article tries to evaluate the relationship via the following hypothesis:
H1: tax avoidance has a positive effect on the auditor's opinion.
The frequent and unexpected changes in the macroeconomic policies create market fluctuations
and uncertainty in the business environment. Consequently, it affects the investors' behavior
(Borio & Zhu, 2012) and the economic growth levels (Baker et al., 2016). Investors are usually
worried about uncertainty which are affected by the auditor's opinion (Ianniello & Galloppo,
2015) and make their decisions accordingly.
Some studies reported that market uncertainty could be a reason for tax avoidance which
reduces the company's effective tax rate and lowers their tax payment (Duong et al., 2017;
Dang et al., 2019). Iran is ranked 79 among 80 countries in Performance Ranking and
Economic Conditions by the Global Bank in 2019. During the last forty years, Iran has
experienced several waves of economic pressure. The current situation is unique; the recent
government political actions in the region caused the deactivation of Nuclear Agreement.
Iranians are now blaming their government for the intense economic pressure from the US.
Consequently, uncertainty has dominated the Iranian economy, and the stock market has been
profoundly affected. All firms became under financial distress and bankruptcy risk. With the
pressure of cash exits, many shareholders sold their shares to prevent their losses (Campello et
al., 2010).
According to Edwards et al. (2015), the cost of capital increases during financial pressure
conditions; hence the managers may adopt tax avoidance behavior. However, tax avoidance
implies a cost that offsets any benefit of cash savings (Lau & Tong, 2008). One of the most
significant expenses of tax avoidance is the agency cost of incorrect/ambiguous firm's valuation
which misleads the shareholders and other investors' actions (Chen et al., 2014). If the
published information does not show the real financial situation of firm and false information
is given to the financial statement users, a modified opinion6 would be expected from the
auditor. Furthermore, we test the below hypothesis:
H2: Uncertainty stimulate/intensifies the impact of tax avoidance on the auditor's opinion
Government presence in the firm's ownership structure plays a role in its financial situation and
performance. Gompers et al. (2003) found that firms with influential shareholders have higher
profits, sales growth, and lower capital expenditures. Borisova et al. (2012) claimed that
government ownership leads to higher monitoring and improved governance because of
governments' monopoly on using coercive power. Such firms may have the privilege of more
market and policy information which positively affects their investment decisions,
Modified opinions are the types of audit opinions that issue to entity’s financial statements when auditors
found that those statements are not prepared and present fairly inall material respect in accordance with the
accounting framework that they are using (Yang et al., 2001; Vichitsarawong & Pornupatham, 2015).
6
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performance and accordingly reduces the risk related to the economic and political conditions
(Li & Liang, 2012). Shleifer and Vishny (1997) observed; however, concentrated ownership
can be useful to solve the agency problem, it may also inefficiently redistribute wealth from
other investors to themselves. Public choice theory suggests that government-owned firms
might pursue vote-gaining goals instead of performance goals because of the politicians'
pressures (Brouthers et al., 2007).
The government which is considered one of the firm's stakeholders7, pays taxes and shares the
profit in the form of dividends and rewards (Mafrolla, 2019). Hasan et al. (2017) reported that
tax payments by government-owned companies are considered a sign of government ownership
effectiveness which improves the firm's image in the public domain. Thus, government
presence in the ownership structure could be seen as a disincentive of tax avoidance. However,
some studies pointed at managerial opportunism (Martinez & Motta, 2020) and the preferred
treatment of government-owned firms, which motivates their managers to utilize an aggressive
tax strategy (Mahenthrian & Kasipillai, 2012). When the government is the primary owner,
and the government supports the manager or a subordinate organization regulates the
monitoring rules; hence, there is a higher chance for tax avoidance compared to private firms
(Krivogorsky & Grudnitski, 2010).
The Iranian government plays a vital role in the economic environment. It dominants the big
companies by ownership and management support. 47% of listed companies8 are either owned
or controlled by the government. 66% of the stock market capitalization belongs to firms where
the government is their major shareholder.
Most of the government-owned firms' managers are on a limited tenure contract. Hence, they
focus showing their excellent performance in the short run, without any incentive for long-run
performance goals. This may induce the managers to utilize any possible method including tax
avoidance. Such managers tend to avoid the tax with less fear of consequences since they are
allowed to report different levels of income to the tax assessors9, and the shareholders. The tax
avoidance by such companies would be treated as inaccuracy in the tax-saving account which
results only in a fine and not in a prosecution like a case for any other private company (Iranian
National Tax Administration, 2015). According to a report by the Iran parliament research
committee, government-owned companies share only 10% of the total corporate taxes in the
2018 government budget.
Furthermore, we expect that government ownership intensifies tax avoidance and modifies the
auditor's opinion. Moreover, we investigate the following hypothesis:
H3: Government ownership stimulates/intensifies the impact of tax avoidance on the auditor's
opinion

7

Based on the Stakeholder theory
Petrochemicals, Basic metals, Automotive, petroleum products.
9
An assessor is a local government official who determines tax payable amount
8
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In the following section, we fill in the existing gap in the literature by quantitatively analyzing
the tax avoidance and modified opinion for the government-owned companies in Iran.
3. Methodology
3.1 Data and Variables
We used CODAL10 for a comprehensive data set of 115 listed companies11 in the Tehran Stock
Exchange (TSE) during 2012-2018. Companies sectoral distribution is presented in Appendix
1. We have two types of firms in our data set; firms with unmodified auditor’s opinion (435
observations) and firms with modified auditor’s opinion (377 observations), with 812
observations12. The independent variable included tax avoidance. We control for corporate
governance mechanism and firm characteristics, including the board independence, CEO
duality, firm size, return on assets, leverage, firm’s chance for growth, distress risk, intangible
assets and auditor’s reputation. We describe the variables which used in our study13.
Uncertainty
Volatility Index (VIX) provides a measure of market risk and investors' sentiments (Chicago
Board Options Exchange). We could not use VIX for the Iran case since only a few big
companies are allowed to use options. Hence, we adapted Kim et al. (2010) who introduced
the twelve months standard deviation of market return as a tool to measure uncertainty. In this
method, we obtain the monthly market return by the difference in the dividend and price index
at the beginning and the end of every month, divided by the dividend and price index at the
beginning of every month:

𝑀𝑈𝑡
𝑅

= 𝜎𝑡 𝑚

(1)

Where;
MUt: Uncertainty in time t.
𝜎t: Standard deviation of market return in time t
Rmt (market return) is calculated as the following:

𝑅𝑚𝑡
𝐼𝑚𝑡 − 𝐼𝑚𝑡−1
=
𝐼𝑚𝑡−1

(2)

Im: Stock market return measured by the dividend and price index at the end of the month (t)
and (t-1)

10

CODAL= Comprehensive DataBase Of All Listed Companies. Codal is a database of Iranian companies.
financial institutions companies were excluded from the sample.
12
In Iran, few companies have fiscal year reporting; they are excluded from our sample.
13
The details about variables and measures are presented in Appendix 2.
11
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Tax Avoidance
We use the effective tax rate to indicate the firm’s tax avoidance. Gouveia and Strauss (1994)
who estimate an effective tax function which relates the actual tax burden to economic income.
Dyreng et al. (2008) said the lower the effective tax rate, the higher the tax avoidance. The
effective tax rate is calculated as the average ratio of tax cost to the average pre-tax earnings
during the last three years (Badertscher et al., 2013; Dyreng et al., 2019).
Auditor’s Opinion
In Iran, the auditor’s opinion is given in two formats; unmodified and modified based on the
obtained auditing evidence. The unmodified opinion is given when all financial statements are
correct and accurate without any misstatements. While, the modified opinion is given if the
auditor concludes any misstatements in the financial statements. The modified opinion takes
any of three formats; conditional, rejected, and without any opinion. We consider the auditor’s
opinion as a dummy variable; 0 for the unmodified opinion and 1 for the modified (Chen et al.,
2013; Cano-Rodríguez et al., 2016).
Government Ownership
Government ownership is defined as the firm’s share range belongs to the government or its
subordinate organizations (Delios et al., 2008; Liu & Subramaniam, 2013; Huang et al., 2018).
We collect shareholders’ structure and composition of big companies from the firm’s annual
reports published in CODAL14.
The board independence
Board independence indicates the corporate governance mechanism.The inside directors are
beholden to CEO, and a greater proportion of inside directors on the board indicates greater
CEO power and board control (Hermalin & Weisbach, 1998). The board’s independence is
calculated as the ratio of non-executive directors to all members. To ensure that objective
financial information is conveyed to shareholders, the company board should be composed of
a sufficient number of independent non-executive directors who are more likely to be free from
the management’s influence (Karamanou &Vafeas, 2005) and the auditor’s opinion.
CEO duality
Agency theory argues that CEOs have conflicting interests and pursue their own benefits which
depart from the stockholder interests of firms. Duality occurs when the CEO holds the chairman
position which, in turn, increases his power and negatively influences the firms performance
efficiency (Garas & ElMassah, 2018). Forker (1992) asserted that a dominant personality in
both roles poses a threat to monitoring quality.There is a tendency to avoid the tax in the case
of CEO duality (Chen et al., 2013). Our model deals with duality as a dummy variable that
takes (1) if the CEO and the board director are the same person and (0)otherwise.

14

CODAL is stock companies database: https://codal.ir/
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Firm size
Firm size is considered one of the important factors for tax avoidance. Salamon and Siegfried
(1977) stated that the economic and political power of a bigger firm outperforms the smaller
ones. Therefore, the size tends to influence the rules, investments, and plans associated with
reducing the tax. We use the logarithm of total assets to indicate the firm size.
Return on assets
Oktaviyani and Munandar (2017) examined the companies with high profitability level will
surely prefer not to do tax avoidance to maintain positive legitimacy from stakeholders so that
the company can maintain the reputation which was built so far and improve profitability in
the future so as to maintain the continuity and existence of its business for long period of time.
Return on assets is the ratio of net income to total assets.
The financial leverage
A company which relies more on debt financing than equity to operations would have a lower
effective tax rate (Richardson & Lanis, 2007). The large lever firms might be motivated to use
tax avoidance as a tool to save cash to pay their debts (Badertscher et al., 2013). The variable
is calculated by the ratio of total debt to total assets.
Firm’s chance for growth
We calculate this variable by the ratio of market value to book value. The firm’s chance for
growth can positively affect the tax avoidance level (Richardson et al., 2015). Management may have
more tax planning opportunities due to the changing environment and increased access to
international markets and products. Hence, managers would identify more tax avoidance
opportunities (Koester et al., 2013).
Distress risk
Distress risk is obtained via Z-score that measures a firm’s default risk. A high Z-score
represents low default risk, meaning that a firm is in excellent financial condition. A firm in
financial distress is more motivated to avoid tax (Richardson et al., 2015). The chances of
modified auditor opinion are higher when the firm’s distress risk increases (Hudaib & Cooke,
2005).
Intangible assets
We calculate this variable by the ratio of intangible assets to total assets. The intangible assets
do not have a well-established market and subjective valuation which can be exploited in
different jurisdictions. Therefore, there is a strong possibility of tax avoidance on the intangible
assets’ transfer when there is a difference in the effective tax rate among different jurisdictions
(Tsipouridou & Spathis, 2014).
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Auditor’s reputation
This variable takes (1) if the firm uses ‘Audit Organization’ as their own independent auditor
and (0) otherwise. ‘Audit Organization’ is the biggest and the most experienced and famous
auditing entity in Iran because it has a larger number of audit partners, audit staff and clients,
proper quality control systems, and greater diversity in audit services (Fakhroddin et al., 2018).
3.2 Methods
We use the logistic regression technique15 to test our three hypotheses since our dependent
variable is dichotomous (Miller, Hui & Tierney, 1991), and the dependent variable is not
continuous. Logistic regression is used with data which has two possible criteria and the
relationship between the criteria and the predictors. We use Jarque-Bera test to exanimate the
data normality. We apply Pearson correlation test to confirm no correlation among the
independent variables. Otherwise, the logistic regression model results would not be reliable
because the calculated beta coefficient would contain diagonal.
The functional model formulated to test the first H1 is expressed as:
𝐴𝑂𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼1 + 𝛽1 𝐶𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝐷𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 + β6 LEVit + β7 MTBit
+ β8 FDISTER it + β9 Intanit + β10 BIGit + ε
(3)

The model in equation (3) has the dependant AO as the auditor’s opinion and ten independent
variables. Company’s tax avoidance (CTA). IND reports board independence. Duality is for
CEO duality. Size is the logarithm of the firm’s total assets. ROA is the return on assets. LEV
is financial leverage. MTB is the ratio of market value to book value. FDISTER is the distress
risk. Intan is the size of the firm’s intangible assets. BIG is a dummy variable for the auditor’s
reputation. We test the positive 𝛽2; to find out if higher tax avoidance will affect the modified
auditor's opinion.
We test H2 and H3 by estimating the following equation:
𝐴𝑂𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼1 + 𝛽1 𝐶𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝑀𝑈𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4 𝑀𝑈 ∗ 𝐶𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5 𝐺𝑂𝑉 ∗ 𝐶𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽7 𝐷𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽10 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽11 𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽12 𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝐸𝑅𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽13 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽14 𝐵𝐼𝐺𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀
(4)

The model in equation (4) has the dependant AO as the auditor’s opinion and fourteen
independent variables. Ten variables are similar to equation (3), Market uncertainty (MU).
MU*CTA indicates the effect of the modifier of the market uncertainty on tax avoidance. GOV
is government ownership. GOV*CTA indicates the effect of the modifier of government
ownership on tax avoidance. We test the positive 𝛽4 and 𝛽5; to find out if higher market
uncertainty and more extensive government ownership will intensify the impact of tax
avoidance on the auditor’s opinion.

15

We use both SPSS26 and EVIEWS9 softwares for data analysis.
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4. Results
4.1 Descriptive Statistics
The descriptive statistics are presented in Table (1) 46.2% of our observations (372 firmsyears) had a modified audit opinion, while the rest of 53.8% observations were associated to
unmodified opinion. Among the modified opinions observation, the average tax avoidance is
8%, and government ownership is 45.53%. The average tax avoidance and government
ownership are 18.63% and 13.08% for the observations with unmodified opinions,
respectively. The uncertainty average is 5.93% for the period of this study. The significance
of the p-values of Jarque-Bera statistics infers normality except for MU, Duality, LEV, MTB,
and BIG which are not normally distributed.
Table 1
Summary statistics
All firms

Firms modified AO

Median

Mean

Std.Dev

J-B

AO

0

0.4621

0.4988

3.88(0.14)

CTA

0.1082

0.1372

0.1394

3.65(0.16)

MU

0.0609

0.0593

0.0116

10.87(0.00)

GOV

0.1823

0.2745

0.2679

IND

0.4286

0.4753

Duality

0

Size

Firms unmodified AO

Median

Mean

Std.Dev

Median

Mean

Std.Dev

0.1026

0.0800

0.0674

0.1863

0.1248

0.0963

1.29(0.46)

0.2856

0.4553

0.2598

0.0944

0.1616

0.1933

0.1601

2.93(0.23)

0.4

0.3967

0.1384

0.1308

0.5428

0.1462

0.3055

0.4609

18.56(0.00)

0

0.4784

0.5002

0

0.1570

0.3642

6.1393

6.2887

0.7285

1.70(0.42)

6.1341

6.2480

0.6608

6.1477

6.3235

0.7810

ROA

0.0932

0.1118

0.1379

2.81(0.24)

0.1138

0.1349

0.1327

0.0745

0.0920

0.1393

LEV

0.6249

0.6032

0.1850

9.73(0.00)

0.6068

0.6024

0.1794

0.6365

0.6039

0.1898

MTB

1.3893

1.4190

0.7414

17.88(0.00)

0.8399

1.0613

0.7601

1.6258

1.7264

0.5674

FDISTER

1.2937

1.4605

1.4889

4.11(0.12)

0.9570

1.0248

1.3980

1.5231

1.8349

1.4641

Intan

0.1100

0.1865

0.1058

3.74(0.15)

0.3186

0.2810

0.0837

0.1054

0.1053

0.0226

BIG

0

0.4298

0.4953

21.72(0.00)

1

0.5376

0.4992

0

0.3371

0.4732

Obs.

805

372

433

Table 2 shows the correlation among the variables under investigation. We find a positive
correlation between tax avoidance and uncertainty (0.171) and between tax avoidance and
government ownership (0.346). Both correlation results are consistent to the first and second
hypotheses of our study which predict that both market uncertainty and government ownership
intensify tax avoidance in Iran. There is a negative correlation between tax avoidance and
firm’s internal features such as Size, ROA, LEV, and Intan, and a weaker negative correlation
with the firm’s corporate governance mechanisms (IND, Duality). A positive correlation is
reported between tax avoidance and MTB and FDISTER.
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Table 2
Pearson correlation matrix

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12

All firms
CTA
MU
GOV
IND
Duality
Size
ROA
LEV
MTB
FDISTER
Intan
BIG

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

1
0.17
0.34
-0.01
-0.05
-0.08
-0.20
-0.07
0.08
0.06
-0.11
-0.01

1
-0.86
0.13
0.09
0.07
-0.01
0.01
-0.03
0.07
0.01
0.10

1
0.04
-0.06
-0.04
0.08
0
0.01
-0.06
-0.01
-0.10

1
-0.02
-0.27
0.08
-0.02
0.25
0.27
-0.40
-0.21

1
0.33
0.02
0.05
-0.17
0.05
0.19
0.08

1
0.07
0.04
-0.36
-0.21
0.58
0.32

1
0.39
-0.05
0.16
0.05
-0.03

1
-0.24
0.14
0.10
0.11

1
0.31
-0.38
-0.30

1
-0.21
-0.13

1
0.40

1

Table 3 assesses multicollinearity severity via Variance Inflation Factor (VIF). As indicated,
the value of the mean VIF is lower than 10. The individual value of VIF for each independent
variable is lower than 10, and 1/VIF is greater than 0.10.So, there is no evidence for the
existence of a multicollinearity problem in the data set.

Variable
CTA
MU
GOV
IND
Duality
Size
ROA
LEV
MTB
FDISTER
Intan
BIG

Mean VIF

Table 3
Multicollinearity Test
VIF
1.02
1.59
1.83
1.47
1.14
1.32
1.66
1.24
1.18
1.07
1.52
1.31
1.36

1/VIF
0.9803
0.6289
0.5464
0.6802
0.8771
0.7575
0.6024
0.8064
0.8474
0.9345
0.6578
0.7633

4.2 Regression results:
Table 4 presents the results for our first tested hypothesis. Based on the results, it can be
concluded that tax avoidance positively affects the auditor's opinion. The tax avoidance
coefficient is 7.783, and its sig is less than 0.05; therefore, we can accept hypothesis H1.
Among model-controlled variables, IND and MTB negatively affect the auditor's opinion with
the coefficient of -9.363 and -2.026, respectively. The Duality, Size, Intan, and BIG variables
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have the positive effects on the auditor's opinion, and the ROA, LEV, and FDISTER have no
significant effects. R2 confirms that 83.4% of the auditor's opinion variability is explained by
the independent and control variables in our model.

Table 5 presents the results for our second and third tested hypotheses. In table 5, it is known
that a significant positive impact of tax avoidance on the auditor's opinions (β1=5.492).
Uncertainty affects the auditor's opinions with a coefficient of 2.847. Besides, market
uncertainty intensifies the effect of tax avoidance on the auditor's opinions by the coefficient
of 1.491. Thus, we can accept H2.
Government ownership has a significant positive effect on the auditor's opinion (β2=4.738).
The government's presence in the ownership structure increases the auditor's modified opinion.
Government ownership with coefficient 2.405 affects the relationship between tax avoidance
and auditor's modified opinion. Hence, we can accept H2.
The auditor's opinion is negatively affected by board independence (β6= -6.350) and MTB
(β11= -2.288). All control variables significantly positively affect the modified opinion, except
ROA, LEV, and FDISTER.. Duality with coefficient 1.397, Size with 2.562, Intan and BIG
with coefficients 0.566 and 4.839 have positive impacts on auditor's opinion, respectively. R2
confirms that 73% of the auditor's opinion variability is explained by the independent,
moderator, and control variables in the second model.
Table 4
Regression results of hypothesis H1
B

S.E

Wald

Sig

CTA

7.783

1.773

10.030

0.002

IND

-9.363

3.222

8.445

0.004

Duality

1.860

0.876

4.505

0.034

Size

6.072

2.254

10.945

0.006

ROA

-5.163

3.003

2.956

0.086

LEV

-0.904

2.843

0.101

0.750

MTB

-2.026

2.113

8.845

0.003

FDISTER

1.271

0.753

2.850

0.091

Intan

1.012

0.410

6.100

0.014

BIG

2.949

1.376

4.593

0.032

C

-4.887

1.693

8.320

0.004

Chi-square
df
Sig
Cox & Snell R Square
NagelkerkeR Square

33.392
10
0.000
0.623
0.834

84

AABFJ | Vol. 16, No.3, 2022 Taherinia, Abdi & Dormishi | Tax Avoidance and the Auditor’s Opinion

Table 5
Regression results of hypotheses H2 and H3
B

S.E

Wald

Sig

CTA

5.492

1.885

7.652

0.005

MU

2.847

0.828

11.818

0.001

GOV

4.738

1.066

6.925

0.008

MU*CTA

1.491

0.652

10.649

0.001

GOV*CTA

2.405

0.997

8.752

0.003

IND

-6.350

2.446

5.538

0.022

Duality

1.397

0.685

4.162

0.041

Size

2.562

0.493

9.240

0.002

ROA

-1.246

1.824

0.467

0.288

LEV

-2.835

6.501

0.197

0.657

MTB

-2.288

1.214

5.408

0.037

FDISTER

0.920

0.636

2.090

0.148

Intan

0.566

0.249

5.167

0.040

BIG

4.839

1.225

7.869

0.005

C

-7.939

2.486

10.197

0.001

Chi-square
df
Sig
Cox & Snell R Square
NagelkerkeR Square

31.573
14
0.000
0.546
0.730

5. Discussion and Conclusion
The main objective of this study was to determine the effect of tax avoidance on the auditor’s
opinions by paying attention to the moderator role of uncertainty and government ownership
in Iran. The results showed that tax avoidance had a positive effect on the auditor’s opinions
which can be resulted from the effect of tax avoidance on the information clarity as well as the
quality reduction of the given accounting information. This finding is correlated with the study
of Kim and Park (2014), which introduced tax avoidance as an opportunity for earnings management,
leading to manipulating the published information. For this reason, auditors may issue modified

opinions when the client engages in aggressive information manipulation. Furthermore, the
absence of a modified report leaves auditors vulnerable to litigation.
The second hypothesis confirmed that the uncertainty variable intensifies this effect. This may
be due to companies trying to save cash by tax avoidance in market uncertainty. This finding
corroborates previous literature (Barnes, 2007; Blackburn et al., 2012; Xu et al., 2011; Pappa
et al., 2015, Schneider et al., 2015) implying that uncertainty affects the auditor's opinion by
creating a higher level of tax avoidance. Uncertainty in the stock market makes the investors
and shareholders take more risk, and it is more probable to face loss. To prevent their loss, the
shareholders sell their shares and exit their wealth from the firm. Tax avoidance is an approach
which the manager uses to avoid reducing the available financial resources, which leads to
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transfer funds from the government to shareholders. Moreover, managers do have opportunities
to respond to uncertainty (Ghosh & Olsen, 2009). One of these opportunities is earnings
management. The extent of opportunistic earnings management is likely to be higher when
information asymmetry is high. Under this condition, the quality of financial statements of the
firm is reduced (Shin & Woo, 2017), and the independent auditor’s opinion which is influenced
by this phenomenon, becomes valuable for the investors, in terms of information (Chen &
Zhang, 2018).
Our results confirm that government ownership with a positive coefficient intensifies the tax
avoidance effect on the auditor’s opinions. This finding supports H2 and confirms the findings
of a number of previous studies (Sudibyo & Jianfu, 2016; Mafrolla, 2019), implying that
Managers of government-owned firms focused on minimizing costs, even if this was to the
detriment of national tax-revenue collection. The results of H2 are in disagreement with some
literature (Zeng, 2010, Chan et al., 2013; Bradshaw et al., 2016). According to the agency
theory, the existence of government as a major shareholder can protect the shareholders’
interests. In the Iranian case, government presence eases the manipulation via the relationship
power and intensifies the tax avoidance reflected on the modified auditor’s opinion. Hence,
government ownership increases the firm’s risk and provides an opportunity for the managers
to look for their short-term interests instead of the firm’s interests.This result is in line with
Chen et al. (2018) study that showed that government-owned firms have a stronger incentive
to reduce their tax payment when the pre-tax earnings are considered as the valuation index,
compared to the private firms.
The theoretical framework considered, the role of government in the ownership structure as a
mechanism of corporate governance which can reduce the agency problems among
shareholders (principal) and manager (agent) because government have experience and
resources that enable it to effectively monitor management decisions. In reality, the manager
of a governmental company has political connections because he/she considers himself/herself
dependent on the government. Their political connections may also help reduce and limit the
penalties imposed in the event that their firms are convicted of tax avoidance. Therefore, the
presence of the government in the ownership structure gives him/her the opportunity to achieve
personal interests.
Like many other accounting and auditing researchers, this study deals with some limitations.
There is a difference between the firm tax declaration and the definite target tax for the tax
authorities. Due to data availability, we used the declaration tax to measure tax avoidance,
which may affect the results we obtained. Furthermore, the unavailability of potential measures
to evaluate uncertainty may influence the results. Moreover, our results do not consider the
government presence positive consequences, such as the protection for shareholders. The
reason is that tax avoidance does not transfer the resources from the government to the people;
it instead increases the agency cost.
Future research can estimate the uncertainty role in the investment process since we gained
some evidence that uncertainty stimulates tax avoidance. Our study result evaluated the tax
planning in the format of tax avoidance, but we recommend that the researchers study the effect
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of tax evasion, which is another approach of tax strategies. The ownership structure is one of
the corporate governance elements we used in our study; future research may examine other
aspects of the ownership structure, such as the ownership concentration, the institutional and
family ownership.
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Appendix
Appendix 1: Sample (companies)
Name
Abouraihan P.
Absal
Alborz Darou
Alomrad
Alvand Tile
Ama
Amin Pharm.
Inf. Services
Bafgh Mining
Bahman Group

Sector
Pharma
Machinery & Equipment
Pharma
Basic metals
Tiles and ceramics
Manufacture
of
metal
products
Pharma
Computers
Extraction
of
metallic
minerals
Automotive
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Name
Khavar Spring
Kowsar Pharm.
Loabiran
Loghman Pharm.
Magsal Agri.
Mahram Mfg.

Sector
Automotive
Pharma
Chemicals
Pharma
Agriculture
Food products

Mashad Wheel
Mobin Petr.
N. I. L. Z.

Automotive
Chemicals
Basic metals

Naghsh Jahan S.

Sugar
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Bama

Negin Tabas L.

Extraction of coal

Neiriz Cement
Nori Petrochemical
Offset
Oroumiyeh Cem.

Cement, lime and plaster
Chemicals
Publication
Cement, lime and plaster

Charkheshgar
Darab Cement
Daroupakhsh
Kerman Cement
Dasht Morghab
Derakhshan Teh.
Doode Sanati
E. Kh. Shargh
Fanavaran Petr.
Farabi Petro.

Extraction
of
metallic
minerals
Petroleum products
textiles
Machinery & Equipment
Extraction
of
metallic
minerals
Automotive
Cement, lime and plaster
Pharma
Cement, lime and plaster
Food products
Rubber and plastic
Chemicals
Automotive
Chemicals
Chemicals

Osvah Pharm.
Pars Khazar
Pars Minoo
Pars Oil
Pars Switch
Petr. Tran.
Plascokar Saipa
Qayen Cement
Razak Lab.
S*Azarab Ind.

Farabi Pharm.
Ghandi Cables.
Ghazvin Sugar
Abadan Petr.

Pharma
Electronical Devices
Sugar
Chemicals

S*I. N. C. Ind.
S*Iran Aluminium
S*IRI Marine Co.
S*Metals & Min.

Glass and Gas
Gol-E-Gohar.

Non-metallic minerals
Extraction
of
metallic
minerals
Food products
Food products
Automotive
Computers
Non-metallic minerals
Pharma
Basic metals
Non-metallic minerals
Automotive
Automotive
Basic metals
Extraction
of
metallic
minerals
Telecommunications
Automotive
Non-metallic minerals
Telecommunications
Rubber and plastic
Machinery & Equipment
Chemicals
Electronical Devices
Rubber and plastic
textiles
Automotive
Sugar
Manufacture
of
metal
products
Pharma
Food products

S*Mobarakeh Steel
S*North Drilling

Pharma
Machinery & Equipment
Food products
Petroleum products
Electronical Devices
Transportation
Rubber and plastic
Cement, lime and plaster
Pharma
Manufacture
of
metal
products
Basic metals
Basic metals
Transportation
Extraction
of
metallic
minerals
Basic metals
Extraction of oil and gas

S*Pars Khodro
S*Saipa
Saadi Tile
Saipa Azin
Saipa Diesel
Saipa Glass
Salemin Factory
Sarma Afarin
S*Iran Transfo
Shahdiran Inc.
Shahroud Cement
Shahroud Sugar

Automotive
Automotive
Tiles and ceramics
Automotive
Automotive
Non-metallic minerals
Food products
Machinery & Equipment
Electronical Devices
Food products
Cement, lime and plaster
Sugar

Shazand Petr.
Shiraz Petr.
Sina Chem. Ind.
Sina Lab
Soufian Cement
Tabriz.Oil.Refine
Tamin Petro.
Technotar
Tehran Cement
Tidewater
Tuka Trans.
W. Azar. Pegah
Zahravi Phar.

Chemicals
Chemicals
Chemicals
Pharma
Cement, lime and plaster
Petroleum products
Chemicals
Machinery & Equipment
Cement, lime and plaster
Transportation
Transportation
Food products
Pharma

Zamyad

Automotive

Behran Oil
Boroujerd T.
Butane Group
Chadormalu

Gorji Biscuit
I. Pegah Dairy
I. T. Foundry
DADE1
Iran China Clay
Iran Darou
Iran Ferr.
Iran Glass Wool
Iran Kh. A. M.
Iran Khodro
Iran Mineral P.
Iran Mn. Mines
Iran Mobil Tele
Iran Radiator
Iran Refract.
Iran Tele. Co.
Iran Tire
Iran Tractor
Jam Petr.
Iran Transfo
Iran Yasa Tire
Iranmerinos
Irka Part
Isfahan Sugar
Jaam Darou
Jaber Hayan P.
Kh. Pegah Dairy
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Appendix 2: Definition of the Variables
Variables
AO
CTA
MU
GOV
IND
Duality
Size
ROA
LEV
MTB
FDISTER
Intan
BIG

Definition
auditor’s opinion: 1 if firm receives a modified audit opinion, otherwise 0
Effective tax rate: the average ratio of the tax cost to the average pre-tax earnings during the last
three years
Market uncertainty: standard deviation of market return on twelve month of the financial year
Government: number of shares held by the government divided by the total number of shares
Board independence: number of non-executive directors to the all board members
CEO duality: 1 if the CEO serves as board chair, otherwise 0
Firm size: natural logarithm of total assets
Return on assets: ratio of net income to total assets
Leverage: ratio of total debts to total assets
Market-to-book ratio: market value of a listed firm divided by book value of the firm
Financial distress: The Altman Z Score is used to predict firm bankruptcy
Intangible assets: ratio of intangible assets to total assets
Big auditor: 1 if the firm auditor is audit organization, otherwise 0
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